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"THE WINTER OF MY DESOLATION" 
CONSCIENCE AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ATHEISM 
ACCORDING TO JOHN HENRY NEWMAN 
Michael J. BUCKLEY, S.J. 
Among the historic advances bringing into realization both the 
promise and the menace of the nineteenth century, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and John Henry Newman identified a momentous revers-
al in religious convictions. 1 Something absolutely fundamental was 
dying. Both discerned an irretrievable decline in the religious con-
fidence and doctrinal commitments that had for fifteen hundred 
years specified the character of Christian Europe and whose dis-
solution constituted now for the individual believer and for the 
religious culture of the West a defiant, even insurmountable crisis. 
Both recognized that this disintegration bespoke not another epi-
sodic appearance of chronic religious alienation nor the momentary 
revivification of an ancient disbelief. A profound cultural reversal, 
unique in Christian history, was claiming the nations of Europe. 
It was a revolution, gathering continual increase in its distinguished 
adherents as an educated skepticism about creed and denomina-
tional allegiances almost imperceptibly matured into an open and 
outspoken dismissal of any reality of God.2 Nietzsche and Newman 
1 "From the time that I began to occupy my mind with theological subjects I 
have been troubled at the prospect, which I considered to lie before us, of an 
intellectual movement against religion, so special as to have a claim upon the 
attention of all educated Christians." John Henry Newman, "On Final Causes," 
as in The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty, ed. 
J. Derek Holmes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) 156. 
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foresaw that this denial was to break upon the subsequent century 
and eventually tell upon all the portions of what had once been 
Christendom. 
For Nietzsche, this was the greatest event in human history, the 
death of God - the coming to acceptance that "the belief in the Chris-
tian god has become unbelievable. "3 For Newman, this dark foreshad-
owing of an even darker future formed "the winter of my desolation," 
as the world moved with increasing momentum toward the repudiation 
of what he held most tenaciously within it: "And in these latter days, 
in like manner, outside the Catholic Church things are tending, - with 
far greater rapidity than in that old time from the circumstance of the 
age, - to atheism in one shape or another. What a scene, what a pros-
pect, does the whole of Europe present at this day! and not only 
Europe, but every government and every civilization through the 
world, which is under the influence of the European mind! "4 It was, 
he judged, an unprecedented disruption: "that the writers and thinkers 
of the day do not even believe there is a God ... Christianity has never 
yet had experience of a world simply irreligious.5 
2 Newman to Mother Mary Imelda Poole (December 27, 1872): "I think either 
Antichrist is coming, or that a great and purifying trial, which may last centuries, 
is coming on the Church. The course of God's Providence is as glorious as it is 
awful. I hear, as you do, dreadful accounts of the failings away among our own 
people, I mean English people. A lady writes me word this morning, 'It is quite 
the exception now to meet in Society a believer'." The Letters and Diaries of 
John Henry Newman, ed. Stephen Dessain, et al., [Vols. 1-6 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1978-1984) 11-22; (London: Nelson, 1961-1972) 23-31; (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1973-1977)] 26: 222. Hereafter referred to as L.D .. 
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 3: #125; 5: #343, trans. with com-
mentary by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974) 183-184, p. 279. 
4 John Henry Cardinal Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua: Being a History of 
His Religious Opinions, ed. Martin J. Svaglic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) 
218-219. Hereafter referred to as Apo. 
5 John Henry Cardinal Newman, "The Infidelity of the Future" (Sermon at the 
opening of St. Bernard's Seminary, Olton, 2 October 1873), Catholic Sermons of 
Cardinal Newman (London: Bums and Oates, 1957) 123. 
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It was difficult even to speak with great precision about what 
was taking place. Univocal terms with which to name this cresting 
disbelief were hard to come by. "Atheism" had for centuries 
denoted immorality, in a manner that one today might speak of a 
person as "godless." So in 1846, George Jacob Holyoake, the last 
man tried and imprisoned in England for the blasphemy that was 
atheism, coined the term "secularist" indicating an allegiance to a 
code of duty pertaining to this life, founded on considerations pure-
1 y human, and intended mainly for those who find theology indef-
inite or inadequate, unreliable or unbelievable. "6 In 1869, some 
twenty-five years later, Thomas Huxley invented and subsequently 
presented to the Metaphysical Society "agnostic" to distinguish his 
scepticism from dogmatic denial or affirmation.7 Newman's studies 
6 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism, A Confession of Belief (Chi-
cago, IL: Open Court, 1896) 35. The description continued: "Its essential princi-
ples are three: 
1. The improvement of this life by material means. 
2. That science is the available Providence of man. 
3. That it is good to do good. Whether there be other good or not, the good of 
the present life is good, and it is good to seek that good." 
7 Thomas Henry Huxley, "Agnosticism," as in Science and Christian Tradi-
tion, Collected Essays, 5 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893-1894) 5: 237-239; 
(reprinted Greenwood Publishing Group, May 31, 1970). Of the origin of the 
name "agnostic" to cover this attitude, Huxley gave the following account: 
"When I reached intellectual maturity and began to ask myself whether I was 
an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist; a materialist or an idealist; a Christian or a 
freethinker; I found that the more I learned and reflected, the less ready was the 
answer; ... The one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was 
the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure they had 
attained a certain 'gnosis', - had, more or less successfully, solved the problem 
of existence; while I was quite sure that I had not, and had a pretty strong convic-
tion that the problem was insoluble ... " 
"This was my situation when I had the good fortune to find a place among the 
members of that remarkable confraternity of antagonists, long since deceased, but 
of green and pious memory, the Metaphysical Society. Every variety of philo-
sophical and theological opinion was represented there, and expressed itself with 
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of the early Church had recorded how ambiguously had run his 
own chosen term, "atheism." Neither the meaning of the term nor 
its applications were precisely fixed, and the range of its indeter-
minacy contributed to the confusion of the religious controversies 
and passions in which it was enlisted. 
For the ancient pagans, as Newman noted, "atheists" were those 
who denied polytheism; for the Christians, those who affirmed it. 
So Julian the Apostate charged that Christians preferred "atheism 
to godliness." Indeed, "atheism" was "a popular imputation upon 
Christians as it had been before on philosophers and poets, some 
of whom better deserved it. "8 As if in rebuttal, Christians charged 
that atheism belongs with the Gentiles who did not know the true 
God. Atheism - "godlessness" - came to denote, confusedly in 
the polemic exchanges, either those disowning or denying God, or 
those disowned by God, or those denying the gods of popular 
entire openness; most of my colleagues were -ists of one sort or another; and, 
however kind and friendly they might be, I, the man without a rag of a label to 
cover himself with, could not fail to have some of the uneasy feelings which must 
have beset the historical fox when, after leaving the trap in which his tail remained, 
he presented himself to his normally elongated companions. So I took thought, 
and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of 'agnostic'. It came 
into my head as suggestively antithetic to the 'gnostic' of Church history, who 
professed to know so much about the very things of which I was ignorant; and I 
took the earliest opportunity of parading it at our Society, to show that I, too, had 
a tail, like the other foxes. To my great satisfaction, the term took." R. H. Hutton 
in the New English Dictionary, but in a slightly differing account confirms Hux-
ley's authorship. Hutton wrote that the word "was suggested by Huxley at a 
meeting held previous to the formation of the now defunct Metaphysical Society 
at Mr. Knowles's house on Clapham Common in 1869, in my hearing." See Bill 
Young, "The Origin of the Word Agnostic," The Secular Web (June 2004). 
http://www.infidels.org/library/rnodern/reason/agnosticism/agnostic.html. 
Essays (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893-1894, in Collected Essays, 5: 237-
239. 
8 John Henry Cardinal Newman, Select Treatises of Saint Athanasius, Volume 2, 
"Being an Appendix of Illustrations" (London: Pickering and Co., 2 1881) 2: 
357. 
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religion their appropriate worship, or those denying Jesus Christ as 
God. 
But by the fourth century, Athanasius could apply the term not 
simply to pagans, but to a fellow, albeit heretical, Christian, claim-
ing of Arius that "he is on all sides recognized as godless (atheist,) 
Arius," as the same distinguished Alexandrian Father of the Church 
had similarly characterized Asterius and V alentinus. Eustathius had 
marked the Arians in general as "anthropous atheious," and Arius 
himself complained that the Patriarch Alexander had driven him 
and his followers from Alexandria as if they were atheists.9 The 
word ranged in and out of inter-Christian controversies. Newman 
registered all of this ambiguity, recalling in a letter to John Allen 
that in the previous century even the great Joseph Butler had been 
accused of "making atheists" by his mode of argumentation, while 
Newman associated David Hume with Epicurus as a "teacher of 
atheism." 1° For Newman himself, however, "atheism" seems to 
mean any of the forms in which one effectively asserts that "there 
is no God," and he saw very little difference between such an 
assertion and the proposition that "nothing definite can be known 
about Him." 11 
Part One: The Problem 
Newman experienced the problem set by this growing atheism not 
as a personal temptation, but as a searching contradiction. For the 
existence of God, he stated repeatedly, was as certain to him as was 
his own existence. 12 "If I am asked why I believe in a God, I 
answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible 
9 Newman, Select Treatises of Saint Athanasius, 2: 354. 
IO Newman to John Allen (January 8, 1846), L.D., 11 :85-86. See also The Idea 
of a University, ed. I. T. Ker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) 49-50. Hereafter 
referred to as Idea. 
11 Idea, 49. 
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to believe in my own existence ( and of that fact I am quite sure) 
without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a 
Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience." 13 Yet 
there was an epistemological paradox admittedly present within 
this conviction: "Of all points of faith, the being of a God, is to 
my own apprehension, encompassed with most difficulty, and yet 
borne in upon our minds with the most power." 14 "Most difficul-
ty. . . Most power." This incongruity proved the experiential soil 
for the profound religious antinomies in the world of the nineteenth 
century. 
For in the culture around him, what Newman called "the world 
of men," he experienced the starkest contravention of his primor-
dial conviction: "The world seems simply to give the lie to that 
great truth, of which my whole being is so full." 15 This opposition 
did not induce the suspension or the destruction of belief, but it did 
evoke a profound confusion - the kind of dislodging confusion, 
as he noted, that one would feel before a world become incoherent, 
as if the external world had denied Newman's own existence or as 
if one had glanced into a mirror and seen no reflection of his face. 
A mirror? Because the world, which should reflect its Creator, 
instead denied the existence of God, as Newman found, in its "per-
vading idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion, 
that condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described 
in the Apostle's words, 'having no hope and without God in the 
world'." 16 
This contradiction constituted the "profound mystery, which is 
absolutely beyond human solution." Atheism for Newman was not 
12 Apo., 216. 
13 Apo., 180 (italics added). 
14 Apo., 215. 
15 Apo., 216. 
16 Apo., 217. Newman is citing Ephesians 2:12. 
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a warring of diverse arguments or even divergent positions within 
a religious controversy, conflicts into which he readily entered and 
in which he felt at home. 17 )t exceeded anything that could be 
called either schism or heresy. It embodied the most absolute con-
trariety between foundational religious claims: between the waning 
of belief and the voice of conscience in which Newman found the 
reality of God as given inescapably. It was a world not so much in 
disagreement as deeply inconsequent. 
To understand something of the telling strength of this antinomy, 
one must recall that Newman insisted upon the indefectibility of 
human certitude. Assent is a judgment that such-and-such is the 
case. Certitude is reflex or complex assent, the "consciousness of 
knowing, as expressed in the phrase, 'I know that I know'." Cer-
titude is thus "an assent to an assent, what is commonly called a 
conviction." Now Newman contended, that judicious women and 
men are in their convictions only infrequently in error: "Among 
fairly prudent and circumspect men, there are far fewer instances 
of false certitude than at first sight might be supposed. Men are 
often doubtful about propositions which are really true; they are 
not commonly certain of such as are simply false. What they judge 
to be a certainty is in matter of fact for the most part a truth." 18 
This assertion was fundamental to the entire enterprise of A Gram-
mar of Assent, that the way that human beings de facto do reason 
is the way they should reason, that there is a connaturality between 
the mind and reality such that in general either human convictions 
about truth are correct or else one will not be able to rest in them. 
It was of critical importance to register "what Certitude is, not 
simply as it must be, but in our actual experience of it." 19 
17 Apo.,217. 
18 John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, ed. Ian Ker 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 129. Hereafter referred to as GA. 
19 GA., 133. 
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And this experience indicates three conditions that assent become 
certitude: (1) that it follows on investigation and proof, (2) that it 
is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction, 
(3) that it is irreversible. "If the assent is made without rational 
grounds, it is a rash judgment, a fancy, or a prejudice; if without 
the sense of finality, it is scarcely more than an inference; if with-
out permanence, it is a mere conviction. "20 But certitude is the 
assent to an assent, and one of its characteristics is its stability. 
The difference between simple assent and conviction told in the 
character of religious belief: certitude was indefectible not only in 
its truth but in its lasting, unshakeable character. While "assents 
may and do change; certitudes endure. This is why religion demands 
more than an assent to its truth; it requires a certitude, or at least 
an assent which is convertible into certitude on demand. Without 
certitude in religious faith there may be much decency of profession 
and of observance, but there can be no habit of prayer, no directness 
of devotion, no intercourse with the unseen, no generosity of self-
sacrifice. Certitude then is essential to the Christian. "21 At a mini-
mum authentic religious belief was the stuff of certitude. 
It is true that great numbers of human beings pass through life 
without either serious doubt or certitude, even "on the most impor-
tant proposition that can occupy their minds." Their judgments are 
only those of simple assent, the beliefs and opinions by which 
human beings live, which usually forms the fabric of the ordinary, 
the day-by-day beliefs and sometimes the texture of their allegianc-
es - human beings who "having very little intellectual training, 
have never had the temptation to doubt, and never the opportunity 
to be certain." The faith of the medievals was such, but it pos-
sessed what was essential for religious assent, i.e., a material or 
20 G.A., 168. 
21 G.A., 144. 
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interpretative certitude. Their religious belief had only to be ques-
tioned in order to develop into that explicit reflex assent that could 
be called certitude. One might term all authentic religious belief a 
latent certitude. 22 
How, then, could religious faith fail in Europe - fail not in this 
or that instance, nor simply with the superficial and thoughtless, 
but fail with serious and reflective thinkers such as George Eliot, 
Matthew Arnold, and Newman's great friend William Froude, fail 
from group to group, even from national culture to national culture, 
and that religious belief fail which was as evident to Newman as 
his own existence? Does one deny that religious belief with its 
interpretative certitude had been present in the centuries past? 
Certainly Newman did not. Yet all over Europe, one saw religious 
belief decline through the centuries that formed modernity and in 
so many instances finally fail. This failure constituted for Newman 
the scandal of the nineteenth century. How was it possible that 
propositions accepted for thousands of years, acts of assent to reli-
gious truth which were at least material certitudes, convictions for 
which men and women went to their deaths through the centuries, 
religious knowledge as well as religious belief that were so much 
of the texture of the culture - how could all of this fail, and fail 
so pervasively and with such rapidity as these shadows lengthened 
over Europe? How was it possible that the intellect, as a matter of 
fact, could not keep the religious truth it had for centuries pre-
served? The question, again, is not just Newman's. Nietzsche's 
madman asked the same question: "How did we do this? How 
could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away 
the entire horizon?" 23 This for Newman constitutes the contradiction 
that demanded resolution. 
22 G.A.,138-139. 
23 Nietzsche, The Gay Science 3: #125, p. 181. 
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Part Two: The Ambiguity of Intellect 
Newman located the rising destruction of religious belief proxi-
mately in the corruption of reason, but this diagnosis mirrored in 
its complexity the very oppositions it was invoked to explain. 
No one celebrated the human intellect more wisely and more 
lyrically than Newman. "Right reason" could come to the knowl-
edge that God exists, that the soul is immortal, that future retribu-
tion awaits the evil. Indeed, these are the basic beliefs of "natural 
religion," and reason even unaided by grace but exercised with 
integrity could discover them. 24 Knowledge could be its own end 
and the university has for its purpose neither art nor utility nor even 
duty, but intellectual culture: "Here it may leave its scholars, and 
it has done its work when it has done as much as this. It educates 
the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth, 
and to grasp it. " 25 But in the brilliant promise of intellect lay its 
liabilities for cancerous self-destruction. 
Newman discovered very early in his life that the intellect could 
corrupt as well as enhance the human spirit. Under the influence 
of the Oriel Noetics, especially Richard Whately, Newman found 
himself in 1827 gradually "beginning to prefer intellectual excel-
lence to moral," a realization to which he was awakened by a 
partial breakdown and the death of his youngest sister, Mary. 26 
Right reason could indeed lead one to natural religion. But such 
reason seems an abstraction before "Reason, considered as a real 
agent in the world, and as an operative principle in man's nature, 
with an historical course and with definite results. "27 It takes a very 
different - a disordered - course; it "considers itself from first 
24 Apo., 218; G.A., 251-263; Idea, 157. 
25 Idea, 114. 
26 Apo., 26. 
27 Idea, 157. 
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to last independent and supreme; it requires no external authority; 
it makes a religion for itself. "28 Such was the critically realistic or 
- if you will -the pessimistic assessment of Newman, a judg-
ment that remained throughout his life. The arrogance of reason 
obtains when the human intellect charts the divine insistently with-
in the coordinates of its own capacities and experiences, i.e., when 
it considers itself so naturally and adequately equipped for the 
knowledge about God that it refuses to admit any disclosures of 
the divine that transcend these human parameters. This was "ration-
alism" for Newman, "a certain abuse of Reason; that is, a use of 
it for purposes for which it never was intended, and is unfitted. 
To rationalize in matters of Revelation is to make our reason the 
standard and measure of the doctrines revealed. "29 
Religious rationalism collapsed the distinction between capaci-
ties for the human and capacities for the divine. Feuerbach and 
Freud were advancing a strikingly similar reduction of content of 
the divine to the human, that the divine was nothing more than the 
human either writ large or writ paternal and extending this analysis 
to claim that this was the underlying object in all religious belief, 
a projection of the human onto an imaginary subject. Newman did 
not deny that such an event took place, especially in the overexten-
sions of reason. Indeed he saw it as the project of rationalism and 
the cancerous destruction of all authentic faith. 
Accept this, that the mode of the human is to determine the 
understanding of God, and you have the arrogance, the disorder 
of intellect. Even if this disordered intellect accepts a religious 
faith, it does so on its own terms. God is reduced to fit the human 
28 Idea, 157. 
29 John Henry Newman, "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into 
Revealed Religion," Tract 73 as in Tracts for the Times (1836), largely reprinted 
in Newman the Theologian, ed. Ian Ker (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1990) 75. 
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capacities to understand. God is like a human being - only bigger. 
Here also, the human reason is still liable to the blindness of self-
interest, to the deception and energies of the passions, to historical 
conditioning and unattended motivations - and liable to them in pro-
portion as it considered its own excellence as proof against them. 
In considering reason within the concrete history of "fallen 
man" as well as of salvation, Newman wrote: "I am considering 
the faculty of reason actually and historically; and in this point of 
view, I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is 
towards a simple unbelief in matters of religion. No truth, how-
ever sacred, can stand against it, in the long run." He spoke repeat-
edly of "the all-corroding, all-dissolving scepticism of the intellect 
in religious inquiries. "30 Rationalism or liberalism - "the anti-
dogmatic principle" - was very simply not the appropriate use of 
reason, but its abuse, its abstraction from the broader contexts of 
religious life and authority and its employment beyond its orienta-
tion and capacity, for the reduction of revealed Mystery to a man-
ageable and obvious set of affirmations. The human mind is made 
the measure of the reality of God, nothing can be told it which it 
cannot comprehend and ground for itself, and that which remains 
obscure and unmastered is discarded. "And this, it is to be feared, 
is the spirit in which multitudes of us act at the present day. "31 
The effect is inevitable: the pretensions of a finite intellect to an 
adequacy and an autonomy that is preposterously unwarranted grad-
ually devolve from its initial and rationalistic claims into the ineluc-
table fate of the rationalist, a bitter and pervasive scepticism. The 
sceptic is often little more than the deeply disappointed rationalist. 
Reason moves most damagingly in this latter direction when it 
corrodes the human conscience. It is here that Newman finds the 
30 Apo., 218. 
31 Newman, "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed 
Religion," 76. 
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possibilities of atheism. For the natural informants or evidence for 
the existence of God available to all human beings are three: the 
human conscience, the voice and testimony of humankind, and the 
system and course of the world. 32 And the greatest of these was 
conscience. 33 Indeed, were it not for conscience, an assessment of 
the other two informants, i.e., of the course of the world and the 
directions of human beings, would have left Newman an atheist or 
a pantheist or a polytheist. 34 The fundamental natural witness to the 
reality of God was conscience. It is here above all that one looks 
for the substantiation of the conviction that God exists.35 If con-
science is corrupted or misunderstood or deadened or neglected, 
there is nothing that can take its place. 
For Newman, the fundamental religious battle is joined in the 
nineteenth century between conscience and what he called "the 
ordinary sin of the intellect." For the corruption of conscience is a 
constant threat in a civilized age, "its besetting sin." Not that one 
denies conscience, but rather that one transposes or translates it 
into another, a weaker idiom: "conscience tends to become what 
is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin 
is not an offence against God, but against human nature. "36 
32 For a remarkable parallel to this triad, cf. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 3: 
#357, pp. 304-310. 
33 GA., 251: "By Religion I mean the knowledge of God, of His Will, and of 
our duties towards Him; and there are three main channels which Nature furnishes 
for our acquiring this knowledge, viz. our own minds, the voice of mankind, and 
the course of the world, that is, of human life and human affairs ... And the most 
authoritative of these three means of knowledge, as being specially our own, is 
our own mind whose informations give us the rule by which we test, interpret, 
and correct what is presented to us for belief, whether by the universal testimony 
of mankind, or by the history of society and of the world." 
34 Apo., 216. 
35 GA., 72-83. 
36 Idea, 165. 
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So Newman could write to Henry Parry Liddon this short note 
in which he named both the kind of adversary and the kind of 
devolution consequent upon the weakening and destruction of con-
science: "What you say about Arnold's new book is most painful. 
But if the generation will give up as superstitious the moral and 
religious instincts of the mind, not the most logical arguments in 
behalf of their truth will serve to re-establish them. I have often 
thought how soon I might get over the sense that murder, as such, 
is a sin (I am not speaking of the natural horror one has of cruelty 
- or of murder as in particular cases an injustice) but of murder 
as such - after I have killed half a dozen persons. I suppose some 
nurses ( not farrning nurses) have not any great horror at the idea 
of killing children. And thus the idea of God may go. "37 To under-
stand the emergence of atheism, then, one must understand the 
religious character of the human conscience and its corruption. 
For Newman contended that just as the witness the senses make 
possible the apprehension of the visible world, so the judgment of 
conscience serves for the existence of God. 
Part Three: Conscience 
One recognizes conscience intuitively, that is, through the same 
internal self-appropriation by which the mind comes to awareness 
of memory, sensation, and reasoning, i.e., as an act of the mind. 
A distinction of terms is essential here. One has "faith" in what is 
external, what is other; but one "intuits" what is internal and part 
of one's consciousness: "I would draw a broad line betwe·en what 
is within us and without us, and apply the word 'faith' to our reli-
ance <certainty> of things without and not within. us ... Surely there 
37 Newman to H.P. Liddon (March 2, 1873), L.D., 26:268. Newman is refer-
ring to Matthew Arnold's Literature and Dogma: An Essay towards a Better 
Apprehension of the Bible. 
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are things prior to faith. I apply the word 'intuition' to such ... Tak-
ing the acts of the mind to bits, therefore, knowledge of my exist-
ence is the fourth act; though I call all four one complex act of 
intuition. Here we have real intuition, but I have faith, not intuition, 
of the external world. "38 One intuits conscience, and one believes 
in the external fact that conscience delivers - as an object not of 
intuition but of faith - that is, the existence of God. This external 
fact is more intimately connected with what is intuited than any-
thing else. "39 The existence of God is an object of faith in one of 
Newman's peculiar meanings of this word, i.e., the conviction 
which arises from what is internal [conscience] about an external 
fact [God] and which is "different in evidence <proof> from every 
other external fact. "40 
Newman is quite consciously transposing the grounds for dem-
onstrating the existence of God from the external world to the inner, 
conscious world of the thinking subject. In this, he is following the 
current of fundamental thinking set in motion by John Locke and 
reaching its crest in the nineteenth century with Kant and Hegel 
- though Newman was neither a Kantian nor a Hegelian. But he 
agrees with that whole intellectual world in what Richard McKeon 
would call its "selection," the fundamental area that must be 
explored and out of which one would derive the crucial categories 
and predicates of thought. With Newman's "epistemological selec-
tion," one investigates the processes of thought to establish war-
rants for the assertion about things. Intuition is prior to faith. 
Like "experience" for William James, "conscience" for New-
man is a double-barreled word. It denotes both the recognition of 
38 John Henry Newman, The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman, 
ed. Edward Sillem, 2 vols. (New York/Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1969-1970) 2:71. 
Hereafter referred to as P.N. 
39 P.N., 2:43. 
40 P.N., 2:41; see also p. 39. 
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the moral content of a situation - in the ethical judgment both of 
what is right and good and what is wrong and evil - or the con-
sequent and experienced imperative, the demand that one should 
do the right or good and avoid the wrong or evil. "The feeling of 
conscience" is thus twofold - but the two are indivisibly one. 
Conscience is, then, "a moral sense and a sense of duty." The first 
is a judgment of reason and functions as the principle or source of 
morals or ethics; the second is a "magisterial dictate" and func-
tions as the principle of religion. 41 The first is the rule of right 
conduct; the second is the summons to and the sanction of right 
conduct. Newman believed that this second contained the primary 
and most authoritative aspect of conscience as well as bore the 
ordinary sense of the word. For "half the world would be puzzled 
to know what was meant by the moral sense [the first use of the 
term]; but every one knows what is meant by a good or bad con-
science. "42 
Conscience as dictate was experienced metaphorically as 
"a voice, or the echo of a voice, imperative and constraining, like 
no other dictate in the whole of our experience. "43 The experience 
of this dictate comprises two moments: antecedent to choice, in its 
sense of obligation that such and such is to be done or avoided; 
subsequent to choice, in the "sanction to that testimony [of con-
science] conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or wrong 
conduct. "44 Newman's argument "from conscience" for the exist-
ence of God comprises both of these moments in the recognition of 
obligation, i.e., of what is to be done or should have been done, and 
also the emotions or feelings that it elicits. He argues that in the 
unsurpassable and absolute character of the command, one experiences 
41 GA., 73, 76; PN., 2:47. 
42 GA., 74. 
43 GA., 74-75. 
44 GA., 74. 
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the sovereign moral government of our lives quo majus nihil; in 
the emotions that attend the command - whether fulfilled or dis-
missed - one experiences that this government is personal, i.e., it 
is the government by a person. Let us consider each of these. 
The phenomena or intimations of conscience are the experienc-
es of moral obligation or responsibility: "You should do this; you 
should omit that." Human perception identifies these intimations 
of conscience as the reverberations of an admonition in some way 
other than the subject, i.e., in these dictates, conscience is register-
ing the commanding - even sovereign - direction given by 
another. One is not simply identifiable with his or her conscience. 
Neither did one create or excite this sense of obligation - any 
more than one created or excited the experience of an external 
world. One found it - or, if you prefer, one was found by it. Con-
science recognizes something or someone that is other. "What I 
am insisting on here," wrote Newman, "is this: that it [conscience] 
commands; that it praises, <it> blames, it threatens, it implies a 
future, & it witnesses of the unseen. It is more than a man's own 
self The man himself has not power over it, or only with extreme 
difficulty; he did not make it, he cannot destroy it. He may silence 
it in particular cases or directions; he may distort its enunciations; 
but he cannot, or it is quite the exception if he can, he cannot 
emancipate himself from it. He can disobey it; he [-can] <may> 
refuse to use it; but it remains. This is Conscience. "45 It is irreduc-
ibly other. 
Conscience is also irreducibly morally and religiously supreme. 
One recognizes - note: recognizes without demonstration or proof 
- that the claim of conscience is superior to every other claim in 
one's life. It must be followed no matter what the opposition. It is in 
this sense absolute - as opposed to hypothetically or conditionally 
45 P.N., 2:53. 
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necessary. It is not another precept in the universe or in conscious-
ness, but supreme over all. Human beings recognize in conscience 
a moral imperative that should rule over all of their other choices 
and actions. Thus, conscience in its dictates is the supreme gover-
nor. 
It is also pervasive. It is present in every option a human being 
confronts and in every choice a human being makes: to permit, to 
forbid, to command, to urge. And if conscience is both sovereign 
and pervasive, then the source of conscience must be in this 
way sovereign and pervasive. But is its source personal; is it of a 
person? 
In his University Sermon of 1830, Newman seems to have con-
tended that a natural religion founded on conscience could reveal 
"no points of his [God's] personal character. 46 But he came to 
perceive that it is the instinct of the human mind to recognize in 
the data or commands of conscience "an external Master" as it is 
the instinct of the mind, indeed, "of brute nature" to recognize in 
the data of sense perception an external world.47 And this instinc-
tive perception of the personal in the imperatives of conscience 
seemed to him to be expressed most clearly in the emotions that 
surrounded the dictates of conscience. 
Before a choice is made, one feels the sense of responsibility or 
obligation for the choice that is to be made; after choice, one feels 
the sense of satisfaction or shame. "Responsibility" - to whom? 
"Shame" - before whom? An experience of responsibility or fear 
or shame implies "that there is One to whom we are responsible, 
46 John Henry Newman, University Sermons: Fifteen Sermons Preached 
Before the University of Oxford, 1826-1843, introd. D. M. MacKinnon and 
J. D. Holmes (reprinted from the third edition, London: SPCK, 1970) 2:22-23. 
See the remarks of Ian Ker in G.A., 359 (n. 73) and of Edward Sillem in P.N., 
2:31 (n. 2). 
47 G.A., 76; see also pp. 71-72. 
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before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. "48 
One does not feel shame before a stone or a horse or a dog; one 
feels no remorse even about breaking a merely human precept. 
When one has violated the claims of conscience in a serious matter, 
however, there is nothing visible necessarily to which we feel this 
sense of unalloyed responsibility or before which we feel shame 
and fear, no one or no thing visible whose claims we, through these 
emotions, recognize as definitive. 49 
Conscience in this manner is like no other experience that human 
beings undergo, and its reference to the personal other is embodied 
concretely in this manifold range of spontaneous human emotions: 
"reverence and awe, hope and fear, especially fear, a feeling which 
is foreign for the most part, not only to Taste, but even to the Moral 
Sense, except in consequence of accidental associations. "50 In 
these emotions, one recognizes that the Other, the source of the 
imperative, has already been accepted as personal. One may be 
mortified if his actions have been ugly, but he feels responsible and 
guilty if his actions have been immoral. 
These various perturbations of mind which are characteristic of a bad 
conscience, and may be very considerable, - self-reproach, poign-
ant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the 
future, - and their contraries, when the conscience is good, as real 
though less forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart, 
and the like, - these emotions constitute a specific difference 
between conscience and our other intellectual senses, - common 
sense, good sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense of honor, and the 
like, - as indeed they would also constitute between conscience and 
the moral sense, supposing these two were not aspects of one and the 
same feeling, exercised upon one and the same subject-matter. 51 
48 G.A., 76. 
49 G.A., 76. 
50 G.A., 75. 
51 G.A., 75 (italics added). 
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These emotions are such as to indicate that their "exciting 
cause," to which they refer, must be personal. 
Newman is not saying that conscience or the imperatives of con-
science are God - they remain finite and human and fallible - but 
he is saying that these are the shadow and the evidence of God, the 
phenomena or the impressions or the experience from which the 
intellect instinctively moves to the assertion of God.52 They are the 
created effect of God, the finite participation in and experience of 
the sovereignty of God. One has the experience in this command 
of an undeniable absolute. While conscience is not God, it is, nev-
ertheless, repeatedly named "an echo of God." For finite as it is, 
it makes a claim upon our lives that is supreme and unsurpassable 
and omnipresent. 
Thus in summary for Newman, both the superiority and perva-
siveness of the claim of conscience over every other claim disclose 
the matchless supremacy of this Other to which conscience points, 
while the attendant emotions evoked by conscience disclose that 
this Other is already and implicitly recognized as personal. 
How is Newman arguing here? Is he saying that we feel obliga-
tion and consequently we imply that there must be an all powerful 
source? Is Newman's God still the God of inference, but now 
the evidence from which inference moves is the sense of duty? Or 
is he saying that God is given in the very act of obligation itself? 
In scholastic terminology, is obligation a signum quod of the 
divine reality or a signum in quo - is obligation like smoke from 
which we infer fire or like a handshake in which we experience 
friendship? 
The answer to this question is not always clear in New-
man.53 But his mind seems to have come down upon the second 
52 P.N., 2:53. 
53 For the difficulty in understanding Newman's position, see Newman to 
W. G. Ward (November 26, 1859) L.D., 19:247. See also P.N., 2:53. 
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alternative with his acknowledgement of "instinct," namely, that 
by a "singularly congenial" movement, an instinct of the mind 
"recognizes" God in the imperative of conscience in a manner 
which parallels, for Newman, the "faith" in an external world. The 
evidence that there are things external to us is the impression the 
phenomena make upon our senses, "and our warrant for taking 
these for evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evi-
dence. "54 It is through instinct that human beings affirm an external 
world; it is through instinct that they affirm that God is given 
in their conscience. This instinctual recognition would explain 
Newman's contention in the Apologia that there were "two and 
only two absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and 
my Creator. "55 "Self-evident?" The word is important. Through 
intuition, the self is given; to the faith that arises out of the instinc-
tive recognition of conscience, God is given. 56 
In his Philosophical Notebook, Newman summarized his argu-
ment: "If then our <my> knowledge of our <my> existence is 
brought ** home to me by my consciousness of thinking, and if 
54 GA., 71. Similarly, human beings come by instinct to recognize the char-
acter of particular authors - a Cicero or a Jerome - from the phenomena of 
their writings. See GA., 72. 
55 Apo., 18. 
56 James Collins records that in Newman's private notes, he lists four main 
reasons for his choice of the proof from conscience, the first of which is indicated 
here. But Collins adds: "Second, the proof from conscience is not a purely theo-
retical process and does not stop at a purely abstract truth. Instead, it makes us 
aware of God at the center of our freedom. It is personal, not only in its point of 
departure, but also in apprehending God precisely as a personal judge and provi-
dential guide. Hence this inference ordinarily yields both a speculative truth and 
a practical commitment of the finite person to God as a person. It is the source of 
a moral and religious relationship with God and thus overcomes the deficiencies 
of the proof from design." See James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy (Chi-
cago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1959) 362-363, 444 (n. 47). See P.N., 
2:67. 
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thinking includes as one of its modes conscience or the sense of an 
imperative coercive law, & if such a sense, when [analyzed, i.e. 
when] reflected on, involves an inchoate recognition of a Divine 
Being, it follows that such recognition comes close upon my rec-
ognition that I am, and is only not so clear an object of perception 
as is my own existence. "57 And again to W. G. Ward: "Conscience, 
or the sense of moral obligation on my mind is such, as distinctly 
to carry with it the sense of an Obliger; or that the immediate shape 
with which it comes to me is, not that of a divine truth, but of a 
divine command or will. The immediate form need not be the ulti-
mate basis. I have only said that my conscience is to me a proof of 
a God, just as a shadow is a proof of a substance. The shadow does 
not depend upon the mere arbitrary will of the substance for its 
shape, but on the nature of the substance. "58 Conscience always 
entails a keen sense of obligation and responsibility. God is given 
to human experience aboriginally as the whence of obligation and 
the whither of responsibility. 
Newman believed that the argument from conscience was the 
demonstration available to all of humankind, that it lay at the basis 
of natural religion. Just as the burden of the Grammar of Assent 
was to assert the justification of the belief of the uneducated, so the 
argument from conscience extended this justification by making as 
a principle of religion what was common to all human beings, the 
unlearned and the learned. 59 And the Grammar insisted upon this 
57 P.N., 2:63. 
58 Newman to W. G. Ward (November 26, 1859) L.D., 19: 247. 
59 GA., 251. It is interesting that Hegel, for vastly different reasons, locates 
the transition of Spirit into religion in the form of conscience: "Der sich selbst 
wissende Geist ist in der Religion unmittelbar sein eignes reines selbstbewufitsein. 
Diejenigen Gestalten desselben, die betrachtet worden, - der wahre, der sich 
entfremdete und der seiner selbst gewisse Geist - machen zusammen ihn in 
seinem BewuBtsein aus, das seiner Welt gegeniiber tretend in ihr sich nicht 
erkennt. Aber im Gewissen unterwirft er sich wie seine gegenstandliche Welt 
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point: "Our great internal teacher of religion is, as I have said in 
an earlier part of this Essay, our Conscience. Conscience is a per-
sonal guide, and I use it because I must use myself; I am as little 
able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another's 
lungs. Conscience is nearer to me than any other means of knowl-
edge. And as it is given to me, so also it is given to others; and 
being carried about by every individual in his own breast, and 
requiring nothing besides itself, it is thus adapted for the commu-
nication to each separately of that knowledge which is most 
momentous to him individually, - adapted for the use of all classes 
and conditions of men, for high and low, young and old, men and 
women, independently of books, of educated reasoning, of physical 
knowledge or of philosophy. "60 Whatever one says about the man-
ner of the divine self-disclosure through conscience, so concrete, 
so sharp is this image of God, gained in this manner, that it can 
elict real assent. 
Why is this voice, the voice of conscience an "echo" of the 
voice of God? Because it is so absolute, so sovereign. It is not 
God, but it participates in the absoluteness of God. It is "the main 
guide of the soul," governing as sovereign everything a person 
does, surpassing in its government every other claim, and at the 
same time pervading an entire life - no time and no place escapes 
its commands. Sunshine implies a sun, even if unseen; knocking 
on the door implies the presence of one asking for admittance, so 
iiberhaupt, so auch seine Vorstellung und seine bestirnrnten Begriffe und ist nun 
bei sich seiendes SelbstbewuBtsein. In diesem hat er fiir sich, als Gegenstand 
vorgestellt, die Bedeutung, der allgemeine Geist zu sein, der alles Wesen und alle 
Wirklichkeit in sich enthalt; ist aber nicht in der Form freier Wirklichkeit oder 
der selbstandig erscheinenden Natur." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phiinome-
nologie des Geistes; nach dem Texte der Orginalausgabe herausgegeben von 
Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), #677, pp. 474-475. 
60 GA.,251. 
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do these commands "necessarily raise our minds to the idea of a 
Teacher, an unseen Teacher. "61 
[A Tentative Excursus: If one wished to ask a metaphysical 
rather than an epistemological question: How, one might inquire, 
does conscience relate to the causality of God? How does it come 
forth from God in a manner so precise that it can serve to lay upon 
human beings the authority of God? As we have insisted, Newman 
is rich in metaphors and similes, calling it the "echo of a voice," 
the "reverberations of an external admonition," "the shadow" of 
the substance of God; he compares it to the knocking on the door 
by someone requesting entrance and to the sunshine or light given 
by the sun. God not only gives conscience its being, but uniquely 
specifies its nature. It participates in His absolute authority, without 
being God. Conscience seems a created participation in or expres-
sion of God as sovereign good:, sovereign, as supreme moral ruler; 
good, as that of which every other created good is exemplified. 
If this is true, then the activity of conscience resembles in its onto-
logical structure the character of contemplation in John of the 
Cross, i.e., "the overshadowing" of the attributes of God.62] 
Objection 
But isn't Newman simply divinizing the superego [Uber-Ich] of 
later Freudian psychoanalytic theory, the agency among the triadic 
agencies of the mind whose functions are both the supervision and 
the judging and punishing of human deeds? Freud equates the 
61 John Henry Cardinal Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions 
(new impression, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927) 65. See P.N., 2:53 
and Newman to Ward (November 26, 1859), L.D., 19:247. 
62 See John of the Cross, "The Living Flame," Stanza 3 with Commentary, as 
in Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodrigues, The Collected Works of Saint John 
of the Cross (revised edition, Washington, DC: Institute for Carmelite Studies, 
1991) 673ff. 
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judging feature of superego with conscience, and, can, like New-
man, speak of the "voice of conscience. "63 How similar is the 
doctrine of Newman to the superego's influence as detailed by 
Freud: "I feel an inclination to do something that I think will give 
me pleasure, but I abandon it on the ground that my conscience 
does not allow it. Or I have let myself be persuaded by too great 
an expectation of pleasure into doing something to which the voice 
of conscience has objected and after the deed my conscience pun-
ishes me with distressing reproaches and causes me to feel remorse 
for the deed. "64 Both Newman and Freud have conscience as dic-
tate. And could not Newman's list of the consequences of a bad 
conscience be equally at home with the catalogue of emotions 
assigned to Freud's superego: "self-reproach, poignant shame, 
haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future? "65 
Further, the personal is present in these exercises of the superego, 
maintains Freud, because the superego originates in the internaliza-
tion by the child of the parental superego or ego-ideal, and it 
"observes, directs and threatens the ego in exactly the same way 
as earlier the parents did with the child. "66 Indeed Freud sees the 
superego as the mechanism that binds aggression, that shapes the 
renunciation of the outward expression of aggression and turns it 
inwardly into guilt. "In Freud's oedipal perspective, the renuncia-
tion of the instincts (sex and aggression) is motivated by castration 
anxiety (fear)" that shapes the characterizes the superego. 67 
63 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, trans. and 
ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1964) 74-75. 
64 Freud, New Introductory Lectures, 74-75. 
65 G.A., 75. 
66 Freud, New Introductory Lectures, 77. 
67 I am grateful here to Professor Diane Jonte-Pace of Santa Clara University 
for these summary comments on the origins of the superego and Freud's own 
criticism of a superego morality. 
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There is no time adequate here to give this objection the careful 
examination it deserves, but a number of characteristics might offer 
some indications that this objection does not pose a definitive end 
to Newman's finding the presence of God within the dictates of 
conscience. Perhaps one could distinguish Newman's conscience 
and Freud's super-ego in terms of four parameters: conscious 
awareness, rationality, freedom, and dominant emotions. Let us 
look briefly at each. 
One must first recognize, that the Freudian superego or ego-ideal 
was itself - as conditioning can often be - primarily "uncon-
scious and inaccessible to the ego. "68 This means more than simply 
producing unconscious effects. It means, as Freud wrote in The 
New Introductory Lectures to Psycho-Analysis, that "large portions 
of the ego and super-ego can remain unconscious and are nor-
mally unconscious. That is to say, the individual knows nothing of 
their contents and it requires an expenditure of effort to make them 
conscious. "69 In its unconscious state, Gregory Zilboorg empha-
sizes, Freud's superego is the "precipitate of all the demands and 
commands and particularly of the taboos connected with what is 
known as 'the oedipus complex'. "70 In contrast, Newman's imper-
ative of conscience is emphatic in its consciousness, following as 
68 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere, ed. James Strachey 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1960) 36. 
69 Freud, New Introductory Lectures, 87. "We call a psychical process uncon-
scious whose existence we are obliged to assume - for some such reason as that 
we infer it from its effects - but of which we know nothing. In that case we have 
the same relation to it as we have to a psychical process in another person, except 
that it is in fact one of our own. If we want to be still more correct, we shall 
modify our assertion by saying that we call a process unconscious if we are 
obliged to assume that it is being activated at the moment, though at the moment 
we know nothing about it." Ibid., 88. 
70 Gregory Zilboorg, "Superego and Conscience," Conscience: Theological 
and Psychological Perspectives, ed. C. Ellis Nelson (New York: Newman Press, 
1973) 218. 
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it does in its indivisible unity with the first moment of conscience, 
the rational judgment between good and evil. This prior moral 
judgment is - for all of its attendant emotions, Newman under-
lines - "a judgment of the reason. "71 Indeed, conscience as a 
moral sense is "an intellectual sentiment. "72 
Reason as such has virtually no role to play in the formation or 
the agency of the superego. It is more a conditioning or compul-
sion from without, an introjection especially of the father's author-
ity. Indeed, "Freud usually discusses the superego as oedipal, 
involving fear of punishment, castration anxiety, and renuntia-
tion" .73 But it is brought about and strengthened more generally 
by the conditioning of parental and societal expectations. One is 
conditioned to accept certain things and reject others. This stands 
in contrast with Newman's rational dictate bearing upon that 
whose goodness or rationality one has consciously and reasonably 
recognized. When the super-ego develops into a pathological 
extreme, it resembles in its exaggerations compulsive hand-wash-
ings, obsessive actions to which one is driven by a sense of guilt 
and whose values obtain simply as a displacement of object and 
an escape from unrecognized guilt. In some contrast, Newman's 
moral commands are a second moment of conscience, the experi-
ence of absolute obligation following upon the moral differentia-
tion of good from evil. Moral judgment and moral imperative are 
distinct aspects of conscience, but only that; the act that unites 
them into a unity is conscience, and conscience is indivisible. 74 
Newman emphasizes that moral judgment and moral imperative 
are two aspects "of one and the same feeling, exercized upon one 
71 G.A., 73. 
72 G.A. 5: #1, p. 75. 
73 Once more, let me thank Professor Diane Jonte-Pace for this summary 
articulation of the origin of the superego in the oedipal experience. 
74 G.A., 73. 
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and the same subject-matter. "75 Perhaps it is precisely in this indi-
visibility that the superego and Newman's conscience so strongly 
and evidently differ. The imperatives of conscience follow upon 
the rational recognition of good and evil - not upon the uneasy 
feeling and compulsive susceptibilities evoked from previous con-
ditioning. If the judgment of right and wrong is not of reason, it is 
not of conscience for Newman. In fact, the moral judgments of 
conscience and the dictate consequently upon them can sometimes 
be at loggerheads with compulsive emotions of attraction or repul-
sion generated by conditioning. Conscience can even contradict the 
superego. 
In the superego, it is the historical past that dominates, and the 
precepts and prohibitions about the present or the future come out 
of the earliest object choices desired by the id.76 These dictates 
bring as prohibitions into the present the parental ego-ideals and 
the guilt and threat one has undergone repeatedly in the past when 
these ideals were threatened or not realized. Newman's conscience 
speaks to freedom, to an experience of self-responsibility or self-
determination, while the superego speaks to and evokes constraints 
and past conditioning. The person, moved by conscience to act, 
feels called, summoned, directed to follow the actions she recog-
nizes as right or good. As she confronts this choice, she will have 
a radical sense of her own freedom, of her responsibility for what 
she deliberates about and chooses; indeed, the responsibility for 
her entire life. 
75 GA., 75. Newman has placed the contradictory in a contrary to fact sen-
tence. 
76 Freud, The Ego and the Id, 31: The origin of the super-ego is "the outcome 
of two highly important factors, one of a biological and the other of a historical 
nature: namely, the lengthy duration in man of his childhood helplessness and 
dependence, and the fact of his Oedipus complex, the repression of which we have 
shown to be connected with the interruption of libidinal development by the 
latency period and so with diphasic onset of man's sexual life." 
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As conscience and the superego are different in the character of 
their command, so they are different in the emotions they princi-
pally evoke. For Newman's conscience, the principal emotion was 
fear; for Freud's superego, the principal emotion was shame and 
guilt. In the Idea of a University, Newman was at pains to distin-
guish his sense of conscience and its religious significance from 
the disgust, humiliation and shame that come over the cultivated, 
but conditioned mind when it realizes its self-betrayal into vice. 
"When the mind is simply angry with itself and nothing more, 
surely the true import of the voice of nature and the depth of its 
intimations have been forgotten, and a false philosophy has misin-
terpreted emotions which ought to lead to God. "Fear implies the 
transgression of a law, and a law implies a lawgiver and judge," 
but the tendency of "intellectual culture is to swallow up the fear 
in the self-reproach, and the self-reproach is directed and limited 
to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming. Fear carries us 
out of ourselves, whereas shame may act upon us only within the 
round of our own thoughts. "77 John Glaser has, consequently, 
pointed out that the characteristic of the superego is its narcissism: 
the need to be right, correct so that one is approvable, lovable. The 
shame resulting from the violation of previous conditioning entails 
the fear of isolation, of being abandoned because one is not lova-
ble. "The thematic center is a sense of one's own value. "78 
One need not deny that conscience in Newman's sense can be 
and often initially is mingled and confused with the superego -
just as true worship and prayer often embody many false and 
superstitious practices without themselves being superstitious, or 
as a false prophet can for a time be indistinguishable from a true 
77 Idea, 165. 
78 John W. Glaser, "Conscience and Superego: A Key Distinction," Theo-
logical Studies 32 (1971) 38. The remarks above on the difference between con-
science and super-ego are very indebted to Glaser's article. 
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prophet. Even further, one need not deny that the conditioning that 
is the superego can command and habituate one to practices that 
conscience will demand and confirm. But it is obviously of crucial 
importance to distinguish them. Newman argues that the experi-
ence of responsibility and fear are both interpersonal, i.e., that both 
of these feelings essentially involve another person: "If, as is the 
case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at trans-
gressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to 
whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose 
claims upon us, we fear. "79 Such feelings as moral obligation 
before duty and fear before transgression "require for their exciting 
cause an intelligent being." The absolute character of the impera-
tive indicate the sovereign character of this other. So the mind 
spontaneously recognizes "the phenomena of Conscience, as a dic-
tate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme 
Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and 
is the creative principle of religion. " 80 If conscience, containing 
both this experience and its recognition, stands as the principle, the 
source of all religious affirmation, then it becomes critically impor-
tant for Newman's reading of the rise of atheism. It is important to 
note that Newman - in contrast with the quinque viae of St. Tho-
mas or the solar system with Newton or the contingency of matter 
with Samuel Clarke or physical design with Paley - offers as the 
principal evidence for the reality of God an experience that is 
intrinsically religious. God is given with conscience. Conscience 
would have to be corrupted in order to corrupt belief in the reality 
of God. That means that the loss of a sense of God can fundamen-
tally only be moral. 
79 GA., 76. 
80 GA., 76. 
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Part Four: Rejected Alternatives 
But what about other sources in nature that would offer warrant or 
demonstration for the existence of God? Truth to tell, Newman 
reposed very little credence in the other two natural informants 
about God, ones commonly cited in the apologetic manuals of his 
time, and this reserve indicates how much foundational importance 
he was ascribing to the witness of conscience. 
The first of these was that of universal consensus, one embodied 
in the rites and devotions and practices extant in the history of 
religions. One must here identify religion in its primitive state, 
founded on a sense of sin, structured with precepts that reflect this 
origin, and requiring expiation, reconciliation, and some great 
change in human conduct. Such religion was the natural, albeit 
primitive, expression of conscience. 81 Later developments, the reli-
gions of civilized times and those of philosophy, are not develop-
ments of this primordial religion but its perversion or contradiction, 
"recognizing a moral sense - ethics - but ignoring conscience." 
This is but "artificial religion," issuing only out of a development 
of the human intellect, "a one-sided progress of mind," and a con-
tradiction to the fundamental religious principle, conscience. 82 
The third natural informant, celebrated in the theologies that 
issued from the mechanics of the previous century and synthesized 
in such works as Paley's Natural Theology lay with the world of 
nature, the system of the universe, its order and precision. 
It includes both human life and human affairs. But what actually 
strikes the mind confronted with the course of nature is not the 
presence of God, but His absence - the dismay "that His control 
of this living world is so indirect and His action so obscure. This 
is the first lesson that we gain from the course of human affairs. 
81 G.A., "Natural Religion," 251-254. 
82 G.A., 254-255. 
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What strikes the mind so forcibly and so painfully is, his absence, 
(if I may so speak) from His own world. "83 
It is true, as Edward Sillem notes, that Newman admitted the 
demonstrative value of arguments from the material universe, but 
"he held, that if these arguments are not regarded as corollaries to 
the argument from conscience, they are of no religious value. "84 
Before the world of nature alone, one confronts not the voice of 
God as in conscience, but the silence of God. "It is a silence that 
speaks. It is as if an other had got possession of His work. "85 For 
in this world of system and pattern, God does not appear and a 
thousand "why's" come out of human experience with nature: 
Why does God not give us more immediate knowledge of His real-
ity? Why does He allow events to move in their observed way 
without divine order? Why is He not more forthcoming about 
Himself, His will, His providence? God does not appear. "On the 
contrary, He is specially 'a Hidden God;' and with our best efforts 
we can only glean from the surface of the world some faint and 
fragmentary views of Him. "86 
Only human conscience can give answers to the questions posed 
by nature, not nature itself. Before this hiddenness of God in 
nature and in the course of human events, Newman saw only two 
alternatives: either God did not exist or God has disowned His 
creation. For Newman, it was a "great question whether atheism 
is not as philosophically consistent with the phenomena of the 
physical world, taken by themselves, as the doctrine of a creative 
and governing Power." The religious question is whether physical 
phenomena teach human beings or remind human beings of the 
83 G.A., 255-256. 
84 P.N., 2:32 (n. 6). Sillem lists the various places in Newman's writing where 
one can find substantiation for this claim. 
85 G.A., 256. 
86 G.A., 256. 
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reality of God. If they do not, the lack lies with the dispositions of 
the person, with his or her failure to bring to bear those moral 
principles by which these data may be interpreted religiously. 87 
The religious interpretation must be made to tell in the theological 
assessment of nature because "I believe that the study of Nature, 
when religious feeling is away, leads the mind, rightly or wrongly, 
to acquiesce in the atheistic theory, as the simplest and easiest. "88 
Even if one is successful in inferring from the data of the physical 
sciences the existence of divine power and divine skill, none of 
them can teach God as Moral Governor: "The essence of Religion 
is the idea of a Moral Governor and a particular Providence; now 
let me ask, is the doctrine of moral governance and a particular 
providence conveyed to us through the physical sciences at all? " 89 
This gave the consistent direction to his apologetics: "For myself, 
as my writings show, I have never based the belief in a God on any 
argument from merely external nature, but simply as implied in the 
fact and deducible from the existence of conscience, nor do I see 
any difficulty in the notion of the existence of a being endued with 
reason (at least in its lower degrees) yet without a conscience." 
Indeed, Newman would go further and make conscience the condi-
tion for the possibility of belief: "Because he had no conscience, 
he would have no idea of a God. "90 
This reservation ran contrary to the physico-theologies of the 
time, i.e., to the argument from Newton's universe and Paley's 
87 John Henry Newman, "Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind," 
in Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford (London: Long-
mans, Green, and Co., 1909) 194. 
88 John Henry Newman, "Secular Knowledge without Personal Religion tends 
to Unbelief," in Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects (London: Long-
mans Green, and Co., 1899) 300. 
89 Newman, "Secular Knowledge," in Discussions and Arguments on Various 
Subjects, 303. 
90 Newman to George William Cox (January 28, 1865), L.D., 21:395-396. 
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watch which had made the arguments from the material universe 
primary. But against those heady days of a foundational unity 
between science and religion, Newman had learned a lesson from 
ancient philosophy, "this remarkable fact in the history of heathen 
Greece against the former supposition, that her most eminent 
empirical philosophers were atheists, and that it was their atheism 
which was the cause of their eminence. "91 And in what did their 
atheism consist, the atheism of Democritus and Epicurus? The 
denial of providence, of final causes within the universe, of God or 
mind dwelling within and directing the universe. Newman relied 
upon Bacon's analysis for this tendency towards atheism among 
mechanical philosophers or physicists: "Physical philosophers are 
ever inquiring whence things are, not why; referring them to nature, 
not to mind; and thus they tend to make a system a substitute for 
a God. "92 Contrary to the attempts to search science and physical 
investigations for foundational assertion about the existence of 
God, Newman counseled: "From religious investigations, as such, 
physics must be excluded, and from physical, as such, religion; 
and if we mix them, we shall spoil both. The theologian, speaking 
of Divine Omnipotence, for the time simply ignores the laws of 
nature as existing restraints upon its exercise; and the physical 
philosopher, on the other hand, in his experiments upon natural 
phenomena, is simply ascertaining those laws, putting aside the 
question of that Omnipotence. "93 
The celebrated attempts of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
tury to found religion on physics received from Newman what 
must pass as one of his most sardonic comments: "There are reli-
gious experimentalists, though physics, taken by themselves, tend 
91 Newman, "Secular Knowledge," in Discussions and Arguments on Various 
Subjects, 298. 
92 Ibid., 299. 
93 Idea, 189. 
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to infidelity; but to have recourse to physics to make men religious 
is like recommending a canonry as a cure for the gout, or giving a 
youngster a commission as a penance for irregularities. "94 It is not 
that all argument from the world of nature and from its order is 
intrinsically false; it is that few are capable of such an argument 
and fewer still to build religious belief upon it. 
The results could be paradoxical: Make religion - as one does 
in these physico-theologies - the conclusion of inference and you 
will undermine it: "To most men argument makes the point in 
hand only more doubtful, and considerably less impressive. After 
all, man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contem-
plating, acting animal. He is influenced by what is direct and pre-
cise ... Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences. "95 
Science and literature may strengthen one's religious beliefs, but 
the foundations for such convictions must be what is direct and 
precise within human experience, and for human beings what is 
most direct, what is most given in and by conscience. 96 Writing 
from Rome in 1847, Newman summarized to J. D. Dalgairns his 
very nuanced evaluation of the apologetics of the time: "(l) I hold 
reason can prove the being of a God - that such a conclusion is 
the legitimate result of reason well employed ... but this is very 
94 Newman, "Secular Knowledge," in Discussions and Arguments on Various 
Subjects, 299. 
95 G.A., 66-67. 
96 Perhaps, again, the opponent in so many ways most parallel in his reflec-
tions to Newman is Friedrich Nietzsche: "Why atheism today? The 'Father' in 
God is thoroughly refuted, likewise the 'judge' and the 'rewarder'. Also his 'free 
will' - he does not hear us, and even if he heard us he could not help. The worst 
of it is that he seems to be incapable of communicating clearly. Is he unclear? 
- This is what I have found out from many questions and conversations as to the 
cause of the decline of European theism. It seems to me that the religious instinct 
is growing powerfully, but is rejecting theistic gratification with deep distrust." 
Beyond Good and Evil, translated with an introduction by Marianne Cowan, 
A Gateway Edition (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1955) #53, p. 60. 
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different from saying that reason is the mode by which individuals 
come at truth. (2) Next I have denied that the argument.from design 
is philosophically true - has the Holy See condemned this? if so, 
of course I retract it - but else I say the philosophical argument 
of reason for the being of God is, not from external nature, but 
from the law of conscience. "97 
If Europe, then, was to lose its sense of God, that loss must come 
through a corruption of conscience. "Conscience may be deadened," 
Newman wrote to Baron Friedrich van Hugel. The accepted prac-
tices of the vendetta, for example, could as the customs of the 
country leave one in "invincible ignorance" that cruelty was 
wrong. 98 As early as his study of the Arians of the Fourth Century, 
Newman had maintained that "infidelity is a positive, not a nega-
tive state; it is a state of profaneness, pride, and selfishness; and 
he who believes a little, but encompasses that little with the inven-
tion of men, is undeniably in a better condition than he who blots 
out from his mind both the human inventions, and that portion 
of truth which was concealed in them." In this way, one could 
understand how Origen was willing to deal in friendly interchange 
with the pagan philosophers in Alexandria, but avoided deliberate 
heretics and apostates. Ignorance of God is not simply ignorance, 
an error of understanding or judgment. The loss of a sense of God 
could only be moral. 99 
Part Five: The Infallible Church 
All of this could happen because the intellect alone was not 
enough to secure the primacy of conscience and its mediation of 
97 Newman to J. D. Dalgairnes (February 14, 1847), L.D., 12:34. 
98 Newman to Baron Friedrich von Hiigel (January 26, 1879), L.D., 29:14. 
99 John Henri Newman, The Arians of the Fourth Century (London: Longman, 
Green, and Co., 51888) 85-86. 
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the existence of God. After sin and within the fallen state of human 
beings, nothing less than a divine intervention could steady human 
beings in their recognition of a divine voice within the moral 
imperative, or could bring them continually and resolutely before 
that which was already present within them. So much countered 
this mediation of God through conscience: the voice of conscience 
was a demand for an austere subjection and obedience even in the 
face of passionate self-interest, deception, the myriad conflicts 
within motivation; the liberty claimed in some intellectual move-
ments and championed by much in the culture was an antomony 
or a spontaneity of human reason that in the absorptions of per-
sonal gratification, indulgence and self-complacency could become 
illusion and rebellion. Before such massive counters, Newman was 
pessimistic about the success of conscience to remain intact. 
What could destroy conscience as the voice of God, as the pri-
mordial witness to God? The gradual erosion of religion through 
the overextended claims of the autonomous reason, the reduction 
of God and the things that pertain to God to the dimensions of 
human understanding and expectations. At first nothing changes: 
the external practices are maintained and the moral content of an 
ethical code unaltered. But gradually and imperceptibly a sea 
change in the understanding of conscience occurs. It is no longer 
a response to the demands of another; it becomes a response to 
what one demands of herself. As mentioned previously, conscience 
in its religious usage can evoke fear as well as shame. Conscience 
as cultivated moral sentiment can evoke only shame: "Fear carries 
us out of ourselves, whereas shame may act upon us only within 
the round of our own thoughts." The autonomous reason severs a 
dependence upon God at this deepest level of human choice, leav-
ing intact the moral life itself virtually unchanged initially. The 
moral life is no longer an obedience to the command of God. Grad-
ually, then, over time and with the increased exile of religion to 
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formalities and the peripheries of life. It seems appropriate here to 
cite a text already considered: "conscience tends to become what is 
called the moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin 
is not an offence against God, but against human nature." 100 Perhaps 
one could say that infidelity, in Newman's sense of that word, can 
begin when the superego subsumes the place of conscience. 
For conscience does not cease to exist, but it becomes self-
respect. When one offends against it, shame is evoked by a sense 
of being a fool rather than a sinner. The religious character of 
conscience dies by a substitution, done so easily under the imperi-
alism of the intellect, of an autonomous moral sense or taste, 
responsible only to itself, for an obligation commanded and sanc-
tioned by another. Moral life becomes only ethical, not religious; 
conscience became, quite literally, godless. Edward Gibbon drew 
the outlines of such an individual figure with his depiction in Julian, 
of a "godless intellectualism" that was "an historical fulfillment of 
his own idea of moral perfection." 101 
As Europe moved towards its increasing distance from real con-
victions about the religious, about the divine and effective presence 
or imperative within human life, various expedients had been 
attempted "to arrest fierce willful human nature in its onward 
course, and to bring it into subjection." But what could have the 
"force and the toughness necessary to be a breakwater against the 
deluge?" 102 The political establishment of national churches in 
various countries in Europe was attempted, but this was giving way 
before its own ineffectuality. 103 
Education was another expedient, and in 1841 Sir Robert Peel 
and Lord Brougham had launched a program which maintained 
100 Idea, 165. 
101 Idea, 169. 
102 Apo., 219. 
103 Apo., 219. 
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"that the claims of religion could be secured and sustained in the 
mass of men, and in particular in the lower classes of society, by 
acquaintance with literature and physical science, and through the 
instrumentality of Mechanics' Institutes and Reading Rooms." 
Newman found this a dream and a delusion. It reduced religion to 
conclusions and opinions, neither of which will sustain human con-
viction under the demands and allurements of life. Both strategies 
substituted notional assent about propositions for the concrete real-
ities to which religious and real assent is given: "The heart is com-
monly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, 
by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and 
events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt 
us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and 
die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion." 104 
Newman would extend the same judgment to Sacred Scripture 
itself, even while insisting that its source is God and its reading grace. 
It has proven historically idle to attempt to make of the bible an instru-
ment for which it was never intended, i.e. a continual response to the 
skeptical human intellect, infinite in the varieties of doubts that it 
fosters and passionate in the urgency with which self-seeking can give 
those doubts form and substance. "A book, after all, cannot make a 
stand against the wild living intellect of man, and in this day it [Scrip-
ture] begins to testify, as regards its own structure and contents, to the 
power of that universal solvent, which is so successfully acting upon 
religious establishments." 105 Philosophic and literary religion becomes 
liberalism, the anti-dogmatic religious movement against which New-
man spent his life; scriptural religion became evangelicalism, which 
played directly into the hands of the liberals." 106 There had to be a 
104 G.A., 65-66. 
105 Apo., 219. 
106 Apo., 39-40. "I thought little of the Evangelicals as a class. I thought they 
played into the hands of the Liberals." 
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divine intervention that was more than human inference and sentiment 
on one side and a book on the other. In terms of this, Newman 
understood the incarnation of the Son of God and the continuation 
of his authoritative teaching in an infallible Church. 
What did Newman mean by an infallible Church? "I would 
rather word the question thus," he wrote, "'Can I be certain that 
God is true and that God has spoken?' And I prefer to put it in this 
shape, because I understand what is meant better, while I think it 
is the real interpretation of any thing which I hold myself about the 
Church's infallibility." 107 
The present infidelity was a "moral epidemic, and it is likely to 
have its course. While it lasts, argument is useless ... Personal expe-
rience of the power of the Gospel is our great, or our only defense 
from scepticism. Argument is of little use. Beyond this inward evi-
dence, an Infallible Church is the main external safeguard - But 
when minds are wilful, there is no safeguard at all. 108 
This conviction brought Newman to an understanding of the 
moral need for an infallible Church, paradoxically one of the most 
scandalous features of the Catholic Church for Victorian England. 
The Church was the continuation of the presence of Christ, an 
abiding reminder of the religious, of the involvement of God at the 
deepest level of human life, an involvement that was both sustain-
ing, transforming, and correcting the movement of the intellectual 
and passionate appetites of human beings. For the Church - with 
all of the distinctions and caveats upon which Newman could insist 
and at great length - could speak on fundamental religious issues 
in the name and by the authority of God. 
For Newman, it was the charism of infallibility which gave the 
Church its meaning, its manner of teaching and action, and its 
107 Newman to Frank Scott Haydon (April 24, 1858), L.D., 18:333-334. 
108 Newman to J. R. Bloxam (February 20, 1883), L.D., 30: 186. See also Apo., 
219-220. 
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peculiar mission to the world. "Supposing then it to be the Will of 
the Creator to interfere in human affairs, and to make provisions 
for retaining in the world a knowledge of Himself, so definite and 
distinct as to be proof against the energy of human scepticism ... 
there is nothing to surprise the mind, if He should think fit to intro-
duce a power into the world, invested with the prerogative of infal-
libility in religious matters. Such a provision would be a direct, 
immediate, active, and prompt means of withstanding the diffi-
culty; ... And thus I am brought to speak of the Church's infallibil-
ity, as a provision, adapted by the mercy of the Creator, to preserve 
religion in the world, and to restrain that freedom of thought, which 
of course in itself is one of the greatest of our natural gifts, and to 
rescue it from its own suicidal excesses." 109 
As a response to the religious self-destruction of human kind, 
then, Newman articulates both a transcendental and categorical 
witness to the reality of God. Transcendentally, there is the author-
itative witness of conscience, innate and supreme in every human 
being, pervasively present through every human choice, and 
strengthened and perfected because interiorly transformed by the 
grace of the indwelling Spirit. Categorically, there is the authorita-
tive witness of the church, the extension or body of Christ, pro-
claiming with certitude the fundamental creed and morality of the 
Christian community and the involvement of God within human 
life - "the great elementary truths" - in such a way as legiti-
mately to demand a response in absolute faith, a community sent 
to and safeguarded in its definitive proclamation by divine mandate 
and the Spirit of Christ. 
Only such a power, contended Newman, could counter those 
beginnings of-error, of religious skepticism and self-interest, and 
gradual disengagement, whose organic and ultimate effect is to 
109 Apo., 219-220. 
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undermine all religious belief in any divine involvement within 
human life. On the other hand, one could diminish the religious 
nature of conscience by destroying any such authoritative ecclesial 
voice by which it could be sustained and safeguarded. And this 
diminishment of an authoritative church, the substitution of reli-
gious sentiment for dogma, had marked European scepticism. The 
rise of complete disbelief, the rise of atheism, was but the organic 
development of such a dirninishment. 
For just as there is an organic development of doctrine, so there 
is an organic devolution of belief. The Grammar of Assent traced 
out one such movement as example: "The third [person] gradu-
ally subsided into infidelity, because he started with the Protestant 
dogma, cherished in the depth of his nature, that a priesthood was 
a corruption of the simplicity of the Gospel. First, then, he would 
protest against the sacrifice of the Mass; next he gave up baptismal 
regeneration, and the sacramental principle; then he asked himself 
whether dogmas were not a restraint on Christian liberty as well as 
sacraments; then came the question, what after all was the use of 
teachers of religion? Why should any one stand between him and 
his Maker? After a time it struck him, that this obvious question 
had to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the Anglican 
clergy; so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revela-
tion of God to man is that which is written on the heart. This did 
for a time, and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him, 
that this inward moral law was there within the breast, whether 
there was a God or not, and that it was a round about way of 
enforcing that law, to say that it came from God, and simply unnec-
essary, considering that it carried with it its own sacred and sover-
eign authority, as our feelings instinctively testified; and when he 
turned to look at the physical world around him, he really did not 
see what scientific proof there was there of the Being of God at all, 
and it seemed to him as if all things would go on quite as well as 
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at present, without that hypothesis as with it; so he dropped it, and 
became a purus, putus Atheist." 110 
The only external power that can inhibit the beginnings of such 
decline, one that could insist upon the intimate and demanding 
intervention of God within human life, is an historical church 
which can definitively and continually over the centuries formulate 
or proclaim the Christian creed and authoritatively decide if a new 
articulation of the faith of this community is its faithful trans-
lation into another idiom. Only a community under such a mandate 
to preach and to summon to belief and assured of an indwelling 
divine assistance could morally ask for faith in its most fundamental 
doctrine. 
This is not the place to explore the relationship in Newman 
between ecclesiology and belief, but only to note that they are 
inextricably united. Both conscience and the church, in variously 
different ways and modalities, speak authoritatively to the Chris-
tian awareness and in so doing mediate - again in vastly different 
ways and modalities - the reality of God. Dismiss either of them, 
maintained Newman, and there is no logical pausing in religious 
disintegration until one reaches total disbelief in the existence of 
God. This was the pattern that Newman saw in the atheism emerg-
ing in his own time and reaching a pervasive presence in the cen-
tury which was opening before him. 
110 GA., 160-161. 
